Back to search

McMaster University

Reasons, Causes, and Eliminative Materialism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis is a criticism of the theory in the philosophy of mind known as "eliminative materialism". While this theory has been advocated by a number of philosophers, none have pressed its thesis harder than Paul Churchland. Consequently, Churchland's work in this area has been the focus of current debates in the philosophy of mind. Although several philosophers have developed significant objections to Churchland's formulation of the thesis, Churchland has always been ready with a convincing reply. For this reason I propose to attack Churchland on as fundamental a level as seems possible, namely, by questioning his prE~supposition that folk-psychological explanation is a species of causal explanation. Without this presupposition there is little reason to expect Churchland's proposed theoretical elimination of folk psychology by neuroscience; for folk-psychological explanation (principally, reasongiving) must be characterized as a species of causal explanation if it is to be replaced by a better causalexplanatory theory of behaviour. I argue that reason-giving explanations are not a species of causal explanation. By undermining one of the central presuppositions of eliminative materialism, I hope to cast sufficient doubt on Churchland's thesis.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
1993

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Campbell, Neil
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Allen, Barry

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
McMaster University
Base URL
macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Campbell, Neil. Reasons, Causes, and Eliminative Materialism. 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/15828