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McMaster University

Reid and Perceptual Acquaintance

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In the recent literature, there is some debate over Reid’s theory of perception. Commentators are divided on whether or not Reid’s theory is consistent with an acquaintance model of perception. I will show that Reid’s views are not consistent with an acquaintance model, but that he nevertheless had good reasons to subscribe to this model. There is, therefore, an interesting tension in Reid’s theory of perception. I then develop a modified Reidian acquaintance model of perception as a way of resolving these tensions in light of an argument contained in Reid’s Philosophical Orations, and defuse recent objections to the acquaintance interpretation in the process.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Sopuck, Forrest
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Sassen, Brigitte

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
McMaster University
Base URL
macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Sopuck, Forrest. Reid and Perceptual Acquaintance. 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18305