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McMaster University

Incremental Fault Analysis: A New Differential Fault Attack on Block Ciphers

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Electronic devices such as phones and computers use cryptography to achieve information security. However, while cryptographic algorithms may be strong theoretically, their physical implementations in hardware can leak unintentional side information as a byproduct of performing their computations. A device's security can be compromised from this leakage through side-channel attacks. Research in hardware security reveals how dangerous these attacks can be and provides security countermeasures. This thesis focuses on a category of side-channel attacks called fault attacks, and contributes a new fault attack method that can compromise a cryptographic device more rapidly than the previous methods when using practical fault injection techniques. We observe that as a circuit is further overclocked, new faults are often superimposed upon previous ones. We analyze the incremental changes rather than the total sum in order to extract more secret information. Unlike many previous methods, ours does not require precise fault injection techniques and requires no knowledge of when the internal state is in a specific algorithmic stage. Results are confirmed experimentally on hardware implementations of AES-128, 192, and 256.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Pogue, Trevor
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Nicolici, Nicola

Subjects

dc:subject × 11

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
McMaster University
Base URL
macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Pogue, Trevor. Incremental Fault Analysis: A New Differential Fault Attack on Block Ciphers. 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/23808