Abstract
dc:description.abstractMy thesis defends an account of partiality justified in terms of relationships. I develop the view that relationships are inextricably linked to wellbeing, and I defend the idea that morality must be concerned with our wellbeing. I try to make sense of this account of partiality with the idea that morality carries a requirement of impartiality. If wellbeing is an important part of morally right actions, and if acting in accordance with reasons of partiality (qua relationships) sometimes promotes wellbeing better than impartiality, then some reasons of partiality lead to morally right actions. Minimally, I argue that for why a strictly impartial (or, on the other extreme, a strictly partial) theory does not work. Both reasons (of partiality and impartiality) must be taken into account and carefully calibrated. More ambitiously, I argue for why partiality deserves its own place at the table in normative ethical theorizing. This is not to say that partiality always leads to right action, rather the suggestion is that there are some forms of partiality (found within relationships) which morality requires.
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2018
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Choi, Daniel Y.S.
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Igneski, Violetta
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier URI
- https://doi.org/10.71548/16021