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McMaster University

A Phenomenological Contribution to Social Cognition: Empathy as Mindreading

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Mindreading is one popular account of social cognition which suggests that we generally understand others by attributing mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. to them. Accordingly, this thesis accomplishes three things. First, it reveals how the mindreading literature bears the implicit but erroneous assumption that observing behaviour is somehow necessary for mindreading processes. Second, after showing how this assumption is false, it argues that Edith Stein’s phenomenological account of empathy offers a true necessary—and as is later argued, also sufficient—condition for mindreading. This means that we cannot successfully attribute mental states to others without enduring empathy at some point throughout the process; and that we may do this with empathy alone. Third, it positions this argument as an explicit attempt to promote phenomenology as a relevant and important discipline for the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychology in general. To accomplish everything mentioned, I start by presenting and comparing the 4E theories of cognition in chapter one. Later in this chapter, I briefly reveal how phenomenology has influenced the development of these 4E theories. In chapter two, I lean on these findings to present and compare how the Theory Theory and Simulation Theory accounts of social cognition compare to phenomenological approaches. Finally, in chapter three I argue that combining 4E and phenomenological approaches to studying social cognition can offer a more fruitful account of mindreading versus the standard accounts alone. Whereas studying social cognition is typically considered to be a task for scientists and philosophers of mind, I argue that Edith Stein’s concept of empathy can contribute to these efforts by providing a robust necessary and sufficient condition for mindreading to occur. Moreover, this provides one clear example of how phenomenology can support research in cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy of mind in general.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Kayssi, Lucas
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Lapointe, Sandra
  • Stotts, Megan

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

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Chain of custody

source
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McMaster University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-19
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citation

Kayssi, Lucas. A Phenomenological Contribution to Social Cognition: Empathy as Mindreading. 2025. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/32244