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McMaster University

Rational Choice, Deliberation, and Determinism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>In this thesis I attempt to show that, contrary to the arguments offered by Carl Ginet and Richard Taylor, there is nothing in the concepts of rational choice and deliberation which would make them logically inconsistent with determinism. To this end, I begin by offering my own analyses, of these and related concepts. Except for the use of criteria and standards in place of wants and desires, my analysis of rational choice is quite similar to the standard conception. In chapter three I attempt to refute Hume's theory of causation and offer my own alternative, the principle of causal entailment. In chapter four, I attempt to point out some of the implications of this view of causation for determinism in human affairs. In chapter five, I attempt to refute the arguments offered by Ginet and Taylor.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
1973

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gray, Robert L.
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Najm, S.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/36
1036
842936

Chain of custody

source
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McMaster University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-18
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citation

Gray, Robert L.. Rational Choice, Deliberation, and Determinism. 1973. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/8391