McMaster University
The Mother-in-Law of Philosophy: Intuition & Experimental Restrictionism Ian Matthew Wright, B.A.
Abstract
dc:description.abstract<p>This project is a response to recent criticisms against the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy, raised by adherents of experimental restrictionism. I begin by discussing and eventually rejecting the restrictionist characterization of analytic philosophy, which I take to be inaccurate and unfair. I examine several accounts of the nature of intuitions in the history of philosophy, in contemporary discourse and as they are understood by restrictionism. I reject these accounts in favour of a more modest characterization of intuitions. I conclude with an overview of the restrictionist methodology. After considering some of its past criticisms, I offer my own critique based on the restrictionists' false presupposition that intuition is a natural kind.</p>
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2009
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wright, Mattew Ian
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Garrett, Brian J.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier URI
- https://doi.org/10.71548/24343
- Dc Identifier Other
-
opendissertations/4598
5616
2049795