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McMaster University

The Mother-in-Law of Philosophy: Intuition & Experimental Restrictionism Ian Matthew Wright, B.A.

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>This project is a response to recent criticisms against the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy, raised by adherents of experimental restrictionism. I begin by discussing and eventually rejecting the restrictionist characterization of analytic philosophy, which I take to be inaccurate and unfair. I examine several accounts of the nature of intuitions in the history of philosophy, in contemporary discourse and as they are understood by restrictionism. I reject these accounts in favour of a more modest characterization of intuitions. I conclude with an overview of the restrictionist methodology. After considering some of its past criticisms, I offer my own critique based on the restrictionists' false presupposition that intuition is a natural kind.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
2009

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wright, Mattew Ian
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Garrett, Brian J.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/4598
5616
2049795

Chain of custody

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Base URL
macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
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citation

Wright, Mattew Ian. The Mother-in-Law of Philosophy: Intuition & Experimental Restrictionism Ian Matthew Wright, B.A.. 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/9477