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Michigan State University

A defense of reasons-internalism

Abstract

dc:description

In this paper I offer a defense of reasons-internalism, which is the view that all of our reasons for action are dependent on our motivations. The rival to this view is reasons-externalism, which claims that some of our reasons for action are not dependent on our motivations. My defense of internalism begins by discussing and ultimately rejecting David Velleman's claim that the debate between internalism and externalism rests on a false dichotomy. From here I consider multiple objections to internalism, as well as multiple arguments for externalism, and argue that they do not constitute good grounds for rejecting internalism. After defending internalism against these objections and externalist arguments, I go on the offensive and offer an argument in favor of internalism. I conclude that internalism is an attractive, philosophically defensible position.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Stringer, Ryan
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Frei, Tamra
  • Nelson, James
  • Rauscher, Fred

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
etd:1892
isbn:9781124603186
isbn:1124603182
oclc:931842852
umi:1491581
local:Stringer_grad.msu_0128N_10369

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Michigan State University
Base URL
d.lib.msu.edu/oai
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Stringer, Ryan. A defense of reasons-internalism. 2011. https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/er51-8836