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Michigan State University

Employee selection practices and performance pay

Abstract

dc:description

Moral hazard occurs when employee effort is unobservable and there is information asymmetry regarding the degree of congruence between employee and organizational goals. The empirical research in management control systems focuses on mitigating moral hazard in current employees, ex post of the hire date. However, both economics and management literature acknowledge that there is significant variation in employees' goal congruence even prior to hire. I examine the effectiveness of employee selection practices in resolving the information asymmetry regarding an applicant's ex ante goal congruence. I find that more extensive use of employee selection practices intended to identify goal congruence is positively associated with future employee performance. Further, I find that the association between employee selection practices and performance is weaker in firms that use performance pay in the initial employment contract. Interestingly, I also find a positive association between employee selection practices and use of performance pay in initial contracts.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Swaney, Amy M.
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Sedatole, Karen L.
  • Krishnan, Ranjani
  • Wang, Isabelle
  • Mukherjee, Arijit

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
etd:2847
isbn:9781321047240
isbn:132104724X
oclc:973325543
umi:3628597
local:Swaney_grad.msu_0128D_12992

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Michigan State University
Base URL
d.lib.msu.edu/oai
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Swaney, Amy M.. Employee selection practices and performance pay. 2014. https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/r8ev-3v88