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Michigan State University

Battles as information : domestic observers, the executive, and cost-benefit assessments during war

Abstract

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"The received literature indicates that domestic political institutions afford accountability over the executive of a state. This finding is especially applicable to war policy given the enormous costs and stakes endogenous to a war. The constraints placed upon the executive are exerted by a group of actors who have the ability to remove and/or punish if in a post-hoc review a war turns out to be sufficiently deleterious to their interests. The specter of future sanction is thought to condition executive behavior, but what if domestic political figures do not forestall judgment until the end of a conflict? Assuming the ability of the enfranchised members of a state to evaluate ongoing war policies, evidence of domestic political pressure might inspire a change in these policies prior to the end of a war. Instead of war outcome and duration being determined by the prospect of sanction after a war's conclusion, the threat of executive sanction might affect the conduct of the war well before its conclusion"--Abstract.

Author and committee

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Author dc:creator
  • Grady, Kristopher Barrett

Subjects

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Rights

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Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

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Identifier
etd:39347
local:MSU_31293029569369

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Michigan State University
Base URL
d.lib.msu.edu/oai
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Grady, Kristopher Barrett. Battles as information : domestic observers, the executive, and cost-benefit assessments during war. 2008. https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/81fk-dv23