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Michigan State University

Coalitional bargaining over fairness

Abstract

dc:description

"Moral attitudes are influenced by a self-interest bias, yet theory suggests that people should value coordination with others in the moral domain. Thus, in deciding what moral propositions to endorse, people have to balance the pursuit of self-interest with the preservation of coordination. In bargaining over contested moral issues, the ability to recruit support from a coalition with a shared moral agenda influences bargaining strength. Accordingly, moral self-interest bias should be moderated by the strength of the coalition supporting one's interests. The current study found qualified support for this account in a group economic game where players assigned to one of two roles with competing interests vote on how to divide a reward. The current study also tested whether the self-interest bias arises due to universal self-deceptive processes and/or individually differentiated strategic tendencies and found evidence that is consistent with both of these mechanistic routes." -- Abstract.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Kubinski, John
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Navarrete, Carlos
  • Chopik, William
  • Cesario, Joseph

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
etd:4181
isbn:9781339969015
isbn:1339969017
oclc:993441018
umi:10141541
local:Kubinski_grad.msu_0128N_14702

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Michigan State University
Base URL
d.lib.msu.edu/oai
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Kubinski, John. Coalitional bargaining over fairness. 2016. https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/7crz-p488