Abstract
dc:description.abstract<p>When a group-incentive system, all participating workers receive the same bonus. Each pay-group establishes a pace which affects under-achievers and over-achievers.</p><p>A null hypothesis, that peer pressure has no effect on group incentives and the distribution of workers' efficiencies will fit a normal distribution, was formulated. The chi-square test was used to test the null hypothesis.</p><p>The first part of the study examined the effect of group incentives on experienced workers. The chi-square test indicated a highly significient difference between the actual efficiency distribution and the expected normal distribution; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. The measure of kurtosis indicated a high frequency of efficiencies at the mean.</p><p>The second part of the study considered the effect of peer pressure on newly hired workers. The new workers' efficiency distribution was divided into 10 time-periods: five periods before incentives and five after they participated in incentives. The null hpyothesis should hold true for all time-periods.</p><p>There was no significant differences in the time-periods before incentives, and the null hypothesis was accepted. Also there was no significant peakedness. In the time-periods after participating, there was significant differences and the null hypothesis was rejected. The peakedness was also significant.</p><p>When workers are first employed, their efficiencies are normally distributed, as would be expected for any group of workers. However, as they progress and join pay-groups, peer pressure causes their efficiency distributions to compress and peak.</p>
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Science in Management Engineering - (M.S.)
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Industrial and Management Engineering
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Witkowski, John Joseph
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Stan S. Thomas
Subjects
dc:subject × 5Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/3651