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University of North Dakota

Major League Baseball Draft Pick Compensation: How To Evaluate The Marginal Revenue Product Of Labor Of Drafted Players

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The Major League Baseball draft is virtually the only means by which US and US territory born players have access to becoming major league baseball players. As a condition of their initial contracts, players are subjected to initial contract terms, that limit their traditional free market ability to earn a salary commensurate with their actual worth. This research attempts to quantify the difference between what players would earn on the open market, as free agents, and what they earn by being controlled by baseball’s reserve clause, by analyzing the current compensation system established by Major League Baseball, how drafted players have limited leverage in negotiations, and whether their compensation approximates actual provided value. The result of this analysis is clear that players on their initial contracts over perform relative to their compensation, relative to players who signed open-market contracts.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science (MS)
Level thesis:degree_level
Thesis
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics & Finance

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Peã±a, Matthew
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Daniel Biederman

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2063

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of North Dakota
Base URL
commons.und.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Peã±a, Matthew. Major League Baseball Draft Pick Compensation: How To Evaluate The Marginal Revenue Product Of Labor Of Drafted Players. Thesis thesis, https://commons.und.edu/theses/2063