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Rochester Institute of Technology
A Generalized Probabilistic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Abstract
dc:description.abstractFriedgut, Kalai, and Nisan have proved that social choice functions can be successfully manipulated by random preference reordering with non- negligible probability. However, their results require two restrictions: the social choice function must be neutral, and the election must have at most 3 alternatives. In this thesis we focus on removing the latter restriction and generalizing the results to elections with any number of candidates. We also provide a survey of related work analyzing and comparing results from a number of authors.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Computer Science (MS)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Thesis
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Computer Science (GCCIS)
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Potter, Jonathan
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Christopher Homan
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://repository.rit.edu/theses/8298