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University of Southampton

Subjective normativity: Understanding reasons and ‘oughts’ as contingent on desires

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis argues that what an agent has reason to do, and what an agent ought to do, are contingent on that agent’s desires. Unless that agent has some desire that could be satisfied (or that the agent believes could be satisfied) by an action, then that agent has no reason to choose to act in that way, and it is not the case that they ought to act in that way. <br/><br/>I will argue for this subjective account of normative reasons and oughts across four chapters. The first two chapters will defend the desire-based account of reasons. I will explain two positive arguments in Chapter 1, one about capacity for action and one about non-desire-based reasons as different kind of phenomena. For the rest of the chapter and Chapter 2 I will defend the account against three main objections, one that can be attributed to McDowell and two to Parfit. I will also use Chapter 2 to defend ‘value subjectivism’ – the theory that what’s valuable to an agent is contingent on an agent’s desires. This will be used to support my arguments for desire-based reasons and oughts. <br/><br/>The second half of my thesis will argue that what we ought to do is based on our desires. Chapter 3 will build on the work done in the previous chapters and demonstrate that my subjective accounts are compatible with a wide range of qualities that we want normative oughts to have. It will also respond to two objections, and argue against a rival account of oughts: that of categorical imperatives. Chapter 4 will then defend my account against its final rival: an account on which there are ‘overall oughts’ that aren’t based on an agent’s desires.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D.
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Southampton
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ventham, Elizabeth
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Gregory, Alexander
  • Woollard, Fiona
  • Janaway, Christopher

Rights

Language dc:language
English, eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Southampton
Base URL
eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Ventham, Elizabeth. Subjective normativity: Understanding reasons and ‘oughts’ as contingent on desires. doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 2018.