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University of Southampton

Meta-ethical naturalism and the fact/value dichotomy

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis I clarify, and then argue against, the “Fact/Value Dichotomy”, which is, roughly, the notion that there is some sort of fundamental difference between descriptive and evaluative language. To accomplish this, I engage with the arguments of both advocates and critics of this Dichotomy, including Paul Johnston, Hilary Putnam, and Sabina Lovibond. I distinguish between two forms of the Dichotomy and, after identifying weaknesses with extant criticisms of the Dichotomy, give a new argument against it. I then explore the consequences of my argument against the Dichotomy for meta-ethical Naturalism, arguing that my approach allows Naturalists to successfully solve Derek Parfit’s “Normativity Problem”.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D.
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Southampton
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • O'Donovan, Fionn Barnsley
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Mcmanus, Denis
  • Stratton-Lake, Philip

Rights

Language dc:language
English, eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Southampton
Base URL
eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

O'Donovan, Fionn Barnsley. Meta-ethical naturalism and the fact/value dichotomy. doctoral thesis, University of Southampton, 2022.