University of Southampton
Essays on CEO overconfidence, labor protection laws, and corporate opportunity waivers in shaping corporate payout policies
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation provides a comprehensive examination of the complex interactions<br/>between CEO overconfidence, labor protection laws, and corporate opportunity<br/>waivers (COW) in shaping corporate payout policies, specifically focusing on<br/>dividends and share repurchases. Through an integrative analysis of three distinct<br/>studies, the research elucidates the multifaceted ways in which managerial<br/>characteristics, legal regulations, and governance mechanisms influence corporate<br/>financial decisions. The findings offer significant insights into the nexus of corporate<br/>governance, legal frameworks, and firm behavior, providing implications for both<br/>theoretical development and practical policy-making.<br/>The first study explores the impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate payout<br/>strategies, with a particular emphasis on the moderating role of board independence.<br/>It demonstrates that overconfident CEOs, who often have an inflated perception of<br/>their own decision-making abilities, prioritize aggressive investment strategies over<br/>shareholder payouts. However, an independent board can significantly mitigate these<br/>tendencies, ensuring a more balanced approach to dividend distributions and retained<br/>earnings. If unchecked, this managerial bias generally leads to reduced dividend<br/>distributions and increased retained earnings, diverging from optimal financial<br/>policies aligned with shareholder value maximization. This study highlights the<br/>critical role of independent directors in curbing the potential excesses of overconfident<br/>CEOs.<br/>The second study provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of labor protection laws,<br/>specifically wrongful discharge laws, on corporate payout behaviors. The research<br/>reveals that these laws, by significantly increasing the costs and risks associated with<br/>terminating employees, prompt firms to reallocate their financial resources towards<br/>more shareholder-friendly mechanisms, particularly share buybacks. The study finds<br/>that in environments where wrongful discharge laws are stringent, firms are more<br/>likely to increase share repurchases as a strategic response to mitigate the potential<br/>financial burden imposed by these laws. This behavior serves as a compensatory<br/>mechanism, ensuring that resources are retained within the firm rather than being<br/>dissipated through costly employee litigation and settlements. Furthermore, the study<br/>concludes that such regulatory frameworks can effectively moderate the adverse<br/>effects of CEO overconfidence, leading to a more prudent and balanced approach to<br/>corporate payouts. This is because the heightened costs associated with labor<br/>protection laws impose a form of financial discipline, encouraging overconfident<br/>CEOs to align their payout strategies more closely with the interests of shareholders.<br/>The third study explores the effects of corporate opportunity waivers (COW) on<br/>corporate governance and payout policies, focusing on the underlying transmission<br/>mechanisms and resultant findings. Corporate opportunity waivers allow directors<br/>and officers to engage in business ventures that might otherwise present conflicts of<br/>interest, fundamentally altering the governance landscape within firms. The study<br/>posits that the adoption of COW provisions can lead to a dual-pathway impact on<br/>corporate payout policies. Firstly, by permitting directors to pursue external business<br/>interests, these waivers can potentially dilute the focus on the firm’s internal<br/>investment opportunities, thereby prompting a reallocation of resources. This<br/>reallocation can manifest as either increased dividends or share buybacks, depending<br/>on the firm’s governance structure and financial strategy. Secondly, the presence of<br/>COWs might reduce the level of scrutiny and oversight typically exerted by<br/>independent directors, as these waivers lessen the perceived need to safeguard<br/>corporate opportunities strictly within the firm. As a result, firms may experience a<br/>shift in resource allocation towards activities that benefit both internal and external<br/>stakeholders, potentially at the expense of traditional payout mechanisms. The study<br/>finds that the degree of board independence plays a crucial moderating role in these<br/>dynamics. In firms with strong independent board oversight, the potential adverse<br/>impacts of COW provisions on shareholder payouts are mitigated, as independent<br/>directors remain vigilant in ensuring that payout policies continue to align with<br/>shareholder interests. Conversely, in firms with weaker governance structures, COW<br/>provisions may lead to a more significant diversion of resources away from<br/>shareholder payouts.<br/>In summary, the integrated findings from these studies provide a holistic view of how<br/>intrinsic managerial traits and extrinsic legal and governance frameworks coalesce to<br/>shape corporate payout policies. The research highlights the critical need to consider<br/>both psychological attributes of CEOs and the broader institutional context in<br/>understanding and predicting corporate financial behavior. This dissertation advances<br/>the scholarly discourse by bridging gaps between corporate governance, legal<br/>regulation, and financial decision-making, offering valuable insights for policymakers,<br/>scholars, and practitioners alike.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D.
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Southampton
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Shen, Jiacheng
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Luo, Di
- Degl'innocenti, Marta
- Mukherjee, Soumyatanu
Rights
- Language dc:language
- English, eng