Abstract
dc:description.abstractMergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important corporate investment strategy with significant implications for firm growth, governance, and shareholder value. This thesis comprises three empirical studies examining the determinants and value consequences of acquisition decisions. <br/><br/>Chapter 2 investigates the joint effect of stock overvaluation and unexercised growth options on M&A payment methods and bidder returns. The results show that overvalued, high-growth bidders are significantly more likely to use stock as the payment method. However, such acquisitions are associated with negative announcement returns, suggesting that the market rationally discounts both stock overvaluation and overly optimistic investor expectations regarding growth prospects. This negative market reaction is more pronounced in stock-financed deals and among firms with higher information asymmetry. In addition, these bidders tend to pay higher takeover premiums and experience negative post-acquisition returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that bidder underperformance is closely related to firms’ tendency to exercise growth options using overvalued equity. <br/><br/>Chapter 3 examines whether stock-financed acquisitions by overvalued bidders reflect shareholder-oriented market timing or managerial agency problems from the perspective of mispricing drivers. By distinguishing potential managerial and non-managerial drivers of misvaluation, the results show that the well-documented association is primarily driven by managerial self-interest through financial reporting opacity and equity-based compensation, while non-managerial sources have no significant incremental effect. Consistent with agency theory, weaker governance further amplifies this opportunistic managerial behavior. Moreover, both negative announcement returns and long-run underperformance are concentrated among stock-financed acquisitions by overvalued bidders that are driven by self-interested managers. These findings highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating the agency costs associated with overvalued equity in takeover markets.<br/><br/>Chapter 4 examines the role of proxy advisors in M&As. The results show that shareholder voting outcomes closely follow ISS recommendations, particularly for M&A proposals compared with other governance proposals. Among acquisition proposals, negative ISS recommendations are more likely when the market reacts unfavorably to the deal announcement, when the relative deal size is large, and when acquiring firms exhibit weaker governance structures. Furthermore, acquisitions opposed by the ISS are associated with significantly lower long-run stock returns, weaker post-acquisition operating performance, and a higher likelihood of deal withdrawal. Overall, the findings support the informative hypothesis and suggest that proxy advisors serve both as effective information intermediaries and as external monitoring mechanisms in M&As.<br/>
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D.
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Southampton
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Ye, Jiaxiang
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Luo, Yun
- Leung, Woon Sau
- Andreou, Christoforos
- ORCID person:identifier.orcid
Rights
- Language dc:language
- English, eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- DOI dc:identifier.doi
- https://doi.org/10.5258/SOTON/01/T030