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Università degli studi di Trento

Game Experiments with Communication

Abstract

dc:description

Economic experiments allow the investigator to achieve a controlled variation of some particular variable of interest, holding constant other background conditions. However, as it relates to communication, such a controlled variation may not be straightforward to achieve. We critically evaluate the design and implementation of game experiments in economics, and provide a review of the literature focusing mainly on bargaining and trust games (Chapter 1). Following some established results of anticipated communication in the dictator game, we investigate whether strategic considerations crowd out anticipatory effects of communication in the ultimatum game (Chapter 2). Finally, we identify and implement an experimental design that examines the role of first-mover anticipated communication on the inter-player strategic power dynamics that exist in a symmetric simultaneous move prisoners' dilemma and a sequential move investment game (Chapter 3).

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Università degli studi di Trento
Year dc:date
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Musau, Andrew
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Mittone, Luigi

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • license:Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Università degli Studi di Trento
Base URL
iris.unitn.it/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
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citation

Musau, Andrew. Game Experiments with Communication. Università degli studi di Trento, 2015. https://hdl.handle.net/11572/369111