University of British Columbia
Realism, not relativism : a critique of Gilbert Harman
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove that relativism is false, and realism true.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts - MA
- Level thesis:degree_level
- master's
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of British Columbia
- Year dc:date
- 2003
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Rawlings, Adam D.H.
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/2429/14987