Abstract
dc:descriptionThis thesis is a collection of four essays studying the oligopoly problem from various perspectives. In Chapter 1 it is demonstrated that though demand curves are generally continuous in differentiated product models, the non-existence of a Nash equilibria is a generic property. Chapter 2 shows that the use of the classical Cournot-Nash equilibrium in quantities is often equivalent to the use of the core solution concept. Chapter 3 applies the theory of local games to the oligopoly problem to show the relationship between the local stability of equilibria and adjustment costs. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability are provided which will often yield a unique locally stable equilibrium. Finally Chapter 4 studies the rationality of both conscious parallelism and predatory pricing in a dynamic model with free entry. An axiomatic foundation for conscious parallelism is provided which is then used to show that predatory pricing, widely defined, is always rational in the face of potential entry. By rational we mean subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the sense of Selten [1975].
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of British Columbia
- Year dc:date
- 1983
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- MacLeod, William Bentley
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/2429/25629