Abstract
dc:descriptionIt is a common notion that we have minds or souls in addition to or distinct from our bodies. This common notion, however, is considered by many to be philosophically unacceptable. This toeing the case many philosophers have attempted to account for the mental in terms of the physical. This thesis examines four such attempts. The type identity theory, functionalism and eliminative materialism are examined and rejected. A token identity statement is adopted and defended. The defense of the token identity statement rests on its form which takes the subject of experience to be central. While consciousness is not explained by this identity statement, I argue that it does enable us to accommodate the mental within a physicalist framework.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts - MA
- Level thesis:degree_level
- master's
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of British Columbia
- Year dc:date
- 1986
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Woudzia, Lisa
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/2429/26634