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University of British Columbia

Mind, body and experience

Abstract

dc:description

It is a common notion that we have minds or souls in addition to or distinct from our bodies. This common notion, however, is considered by many to be philosophically unacceptable. This toeing the case many philosophers have attempted to account for the mental in terms of the physical. This thesis examines four such attempts. The type identity theory, functionalism and eliminative materialism are examined and rejected. A token identity statement is adopted and defended. The defense of the token identity statement rests on its form which takes the subject of experience to be central. While consciousness is not explained by this identity statement, I argue that it does enable us to accommodate the mental within a physicalist framework.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Arts - MA
Level thesis:degree_level
master's
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
1986

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Woudzia, Lisa

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/26634

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Woudzia, Lisa. Mind, body and experience. master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/26634