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University of British Columbia

A two-period model of signaling with ownership retention

Abstract

dc:description

This dissertation is an extension of Leland and Pyle's (1977) signaling model. It introduces the length of the retention period to which the entrepreneur commits in the prospectus as a signal of firm value, in addition to the retention level. The analysis uses concepts of game theory to examine a two-period model where an entrepreneur seeks to issue shares on the market and invest in a productive project that generates outcomes which are publicly announced at the end of the next two periods. The entrepreneur can retain some of her firm's shares and trade them later on the secondary market, after information has been released about the outcomes. The length of the retention period is found to be a signaling mechanism that complements ownership retention. Depending on the information structure of the firm, a longer retention period may reduce or increase the retention level necessary for separation. The model also shows that there are realistic situations in which entrepreneurs prefer to retain a portion of their firm's shares for longer than the minimum retention period imposed by regulations, and others in which she prefers the shortest period possible. The optimal combination of under-diversification and commitment is shown to depend on the information structure and the probability distribution of outcomes of the firm. The empirical implications of the model are tested on the set of firms that made an initial public offering in 1981. Although the results of the tests are generally consistent with the predictions of the model, they are not strong enough to reject the null hypotheses.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
1992

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Courteau, Lucie

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/2943

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Courteau, Lucie. A two-period model of signaling with ownership retention. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/2943