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University of British Columbia

Simpson's paradox in epistemology and decision theory

Abstract

dc:description

I discuss the implications of Simpson’s paradox for epistemology and decision theory. In Chapter One I outline the paradox, focussing on its identification, nature, and type of reasoning that it involves. In Chapter Two I discuss the view that Simpson’s paradox is resolved by means of graph-based causal analysis. In Chapter Three I outline a major problem (hitherto unacknowledged) that Simpson’s paradox poses for the probabilistic Bayesian theory of evidence. I make a proposal to split the probabilistic concept of evidence into a causal and a news-value kind of evidence, tracking causal probabilities under an intervention, and tracking overall probabilistic relevance under conditioning. In Chapters Four and Five I apply the proposal to two further areas of concern. In Chapter Four I defend a unified causal view of Simpson’s paradox. In Chapter Five I defuse a problem about counterfactual force of evidence. In Chapters Six and Seven I discuss Simpson’s paradox and the sure thing principle in decision theory. I then conclude in Chapter Eight.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Memetea, Sonia

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 Canada
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/53486

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
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citation

Memetea, Sonia. Simpson's paradox in epistemology and decision theory. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/53486