Back to search

University of British Columbia

Rationalizing legislative rule change : three cases of rule change in the Canadian House of Commons

Abstract

dc:description

What stops governments from unilaterally changing the rules of parliament? I argue that governing parties fail to unilaterally restrict the rights of the legislative minority due to the expectation that their actions will be perceived negatively by the electorate. Through reference to three episodes of legislative rule change in Canadian history, I show with formal modelling that expectations of audience costs can reduce the likelihood of a government implementing rule changes unilaterally. Using newspaper coverage of the debates over rule change as a measure of audience costs, I show that the government ignores the opposition when audience costs are low and tries to compromise when audience costs are high.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Arts - MA
Level thesis:degree_level
master's
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Political Science
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bosley, Mitchell

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/64665

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Bosley, Mitchell. Rationalizing legislative rule change : three cases of rule change in the Canadian House of Commons. master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/64665