University of British Columbia
Epistemic dependence and autonomy in justification: the case for intellectual autonomy in schools
Abstract
dc:descriptionIn this thesis I outline a conception of intellectual autonomy, and defend it against arguments that question the value of intellectual autonomy as an educational goal. Beyond offering a view of intellectual autonomy that is free of the defects found in other conceptions, I assess the rationality of belief on testimony, and consider the impact that externalist theories of epistemic justification might have on arguments such as mine that defend autonomy in justification. I argue that belief on testimony is more rational than is typically allowed, and that intellectual autonomy cannot be justified solely in terms of the conditions necessary for knowledge or justification. I argue instead that intellectual autonomy is best conceived as an epistemic virtue, and best fostered by introducing students to practices of epistemic justification, in classroom environments characterized by a commitment to open dialogue and debate.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
- Level thesis:degree_level
- doctoral
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Social Studies Education
- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of British Columbia
- Year dc:date
- 1994
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Ross, Murray
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/2429/7165