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University of British Columbia

Quine on opacity in modal and doxastic contexts

Abstract

dc:description

Quine has been mainly opposed to sentences that feature cross-quantification. That is, he is critical of sentences that involve quantifying into a context that Quine labels 'opaque1. Quine's opposition to cross-quantification grew out of an earlier attack on the notion of combining quantification theory and modal logic. Quine initially dismissed, in 1943, cases of quantifying into modal contexts as meaningless. Later in the same year, Alonzo Church argued that there was a meaningful way to quantify into modal contexts, thus vindicating the notion that quantification theory could be merged with modal logic. In 1956, in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," Quine pointed out that quantification into belief contexts, though indispensable, also features the improper quantification into opaque contexts. In the same paper, Quine introduced the distinction between a relational and a notional sense of propositional attitude ascriptions. The former sense concerns the problematic sentences that feature cross-quantification. In the thesis that follows, I appropriate Quine's terminology and critically evaluate his reasons for rejecting the relational idiom in both modal and doxastic contexts. Such an evaluation reveals some startling results in the philosophy of language. One of the major problems that Quine sought to address was that of reconciling the evident significance of instances of the relational idiom with their many alleged difficulties. Quine restricted himself to acknowledging the idiom's meaningfulness in doxastic contexts. Most of Quine's criticisms of the relational idiom are argued by me to be unsound. It is contended that some of Quine's criticisms involve the improper exploitation of ambiguities inherent in such sentences. This fallacy is exposed and subjected to a critical evaluation. The exposure of this fallacy, which I term 'the relational fallacy' is a novel contribution to the philosophy of language. Another novel contribution to the philosophy of language is my critique of Quine's use of semantic ascent to account for intuitively meaningful relational modal sentences. A third, slightly less novel, contribution to the philosophy of language involves extending Quine's temporary view that there are meaningful relational sentences in doxastic contents to the analogous observation that there are meaningful relational sentences in modal contexts.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
1995

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Dickson, Mark William

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/7280

Chain of custody

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University of British Columbia
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-19
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citation

Dickson, Mark William. Quine on opacity in modal and doxastic contexts. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/7280