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University of British Columbia

Essays in the economics of costly misrepresentation

Abstract

dc:description

This dissertation studies strategic interaction between informed parties and uninformed parties when misrepresenting private information is costly, and optimal mechanisms for the uninformed parties. Chapters 1 and 2 analyze a screening problem in which an agent incurs a fixed cost of lying when she misrepresents her private information. In this environment, local incentive constraints are not binding in the optimal mechanism, and standard techniques for solving screening problems are not applicable. Chapter 1 establishes general properties of the optimal mechanism. Chapter 2 develops a new methodology to tackle the problem with non-local binding constraints, characterizes the optimal mechanism and computes it in special cases. The method involves a procedure that jointly solves for the binding non-local incentive constraints and the optimal allocation. The optimal mechanism has a number of novel qualitative properties, such as lack of exclusion and first-best efficient allocation at high- and low- ends of the spectrum of types. Also, bunching never occurs, as the optimal quantity allocation is always increasing in type irrespectively of type distribution. Chapter 3 analyzes strategic interactions between lying and lie-detection, and studies the optimal design for costly lie-detection and its effectiveness. An informed sender wants to persuade an uninformed receiver to take high actions but the receiver wants to match the action with the true state. The sender makes a claim about the true state and the receiver decides whether to incur a cost to inspect the truthfulness of the claim. I show that the receiver-optimal equilibrium has a three-interval structure: types in the top interval make precise and truthful claims about the state, which are mimicked by types in the bottom interval and randomly inspected, while types in the middle interval make a truthful but vague claim that is never inspected. Compared to state verification, lie-detection is shown to be more beneficial to the receiver because it provides incentives for moderate and high types to be truthful. This suggests that fact-checking of politicians' claims is effective in holding them countable and deterring them from lying.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Tam, Yin Chi

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/76447

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
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citation

Tam, Yin Chi. Essays in the economics of costly misrepresentation. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/76447