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University of British Columbia

Data-driven detection and verification of replay attacks on industrial control systems

Abstract

dc:description

With the advent of Industrial Internet of Things and the push towards digitization, industrial control systems have undergone an increase in connectivity, which enables remote monitoring and control. This in turn has led to their increased vulnerability to several cyberattacks. These attacks can have severe consequences, including equipment damage, service disruption, and even compromising public safety. This thesis focuses on a certain type of cyberattacks, called replay attack. A replay attack involves capturing legitimate communication signals between components in an industrial control system and replaying it later to disrupt system operations or perform other attacks. This thesis presents a comprehensive study on the detection of replay attacks on sensor measurements in industrial control systems. Utilising the vast amount of operational data (i.e. sensor measurements) generated by industrial control systems, a novel data-driven two-stage detection and verification framework is proposed. The proposed framework combines statistical techniques, signal processing and deep learning to detect replay attacks on industrial control systems. The first stage of the detection method consists of continuous monitoring of sensor measurements by performing change-point detection based on the corresponding matrix profile. This stage provides an early indicator of a potential replay attack. The second stage provides a validation of whether the detected change-point is due to a replay attack or not. This stage consists of performing time-frequency analysis using short-time Fourier transform to generate a spectrogram, introducing spectral features to the time-series sensor measurements. Then, the spectrogram is split into image frames, creating spectro-temporal features. A Convolutional Long- Short Term Memory based autoencoder (ConvLSTM-AE) is designed to capture these spectro-temporal features in an unsupervised manner, where a replay attack is detected based on the reconstruction error. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed detection and verification framework, it is tested on different replay attack scenarios defined, in data generated using the Tennessee Eastman process benchmark simulation system/process.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Applied Science - MASc
Level thesis:degree_level
master's
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Electrical Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gargoum, Sara
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Al-Dabbagh, Ahmad
  • Feng, Chen

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/85543

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Gargoum, Sara. Data-driven detection and verification of replay attacks on industrial control systems. master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 2023. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/85543