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University of British Columbia

The normative significance of epistemic agency

Abstract

dc:description

Much recent work in epistemology assumes that externalist frameworks are needed to best capture how moral, political, and social factors shape our epistemic lives. Externalist frameworks hold that what matters most epistemically is securing a veridical or truth-conducive relationship to the world. I challenge this trend by arguing against factive theories of justification—theories that hold that only true beliefs can be justified. Though once confined to the fringes of epistemology, factive theories have surged in popularity. I argue that we should resist a turn towards factive theories of justification because such theories imply implausible verdicts about epistemic agency. In particular, they imply implausible verdicts about the agency of those who are deceived. To make this case, I first motivate the intuition that there is something disrespectful about factive theories of justification and suggest that this is because they mistakenly imply that deceived believers suffer a substantial diminishment of epistemic agency. I then analyze the notion of epistemic agency to substantiate this hypothesis. By and large, existing accounts of epistemic agency understand the notion as a kind of control we exercise over our epistemic lives. I argue that these accounts do not adequately elucidate the notions of control they propose. As an alternative, I propose that epistemic agency centrally concerns the ability to justify our beliefs, which in turn is underwritten by two more basic abilities, the ability to set epistemic contexts and the ability to conditionalize on our evidence. Next, I illustrate how this alternative account can shed insight on cases in which epistemic agency is compromised by providing an analysis of how gaslighting occurs. I then conclude by connecting these insights to other normative domains. I argue that epistemic normativity might call for a distinct structure from other kinds of normativity and demonstrate this by providing an externalist account of the aesthetic normativity of cultural appropriation.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Pearson, Phyllis
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/88607

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Pearson, Phyllis. The normative significance of epistemic agency. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/88607