Back to search

University of British Columbia

Essays in behavioral economics

Abstract

dc:description

Chapter 1 studies how expecting anti-favela discrimination among jobseekers in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, affects job-seeking behaviors. We document that most jobseekers overestimate anti-favela discrimination, as we measured in an ancillary study. Jobseekers randomly told that their interviewer would know their name and address believed that their interview performance was 0.17SD worse than those who were told that the interviewer would only know their name, and those who expected at-or-above median discrimination not only believed that they performed worse, but were also rated worse by 0.22SD. Average application rates are inelastic to expected anti-favela discrimination, but different interventions can relatively benefit white or non-white jobseekers. Chapter 2 studies whether, and when, tweets about racial justice predict costly race-related behaviors. Individuals who tweet about racial justice are less likely to discriminate against Black individuals and more likely to donate to a civil rights organization. However, three empirical patterns suggest that higher signalling stakes weaken this correlation. First, racial justice tweets became mostly uninformative during the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd. Second, informativeness is driven by low-visibility types of tweets. Third, racial justice retweets are somewhat less informative of donation behavior than private statements of support. Chapter 3 analyzes a dynamic coordination model under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. I document a novel mechanism through which present bias can be adaptive: it can internalize the social cost of coordinating on a new action, say going from coordinating on using Twitter to using Threads. Agents migrating from Twitter to Threads ignore that migrating imposes negative externalities on those still using Twitter. So, to achieve efficiency, regular exponential discounters should ask for a higher relative quality of Threads before adopting it. As present biased agents overreact to the migration cost (a temporary loss of externalities), present bias leads to asking for more quality before migrations, preventing inefficiencies.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Angeli, Deivis
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Lowe, Matt

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/88645

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Angeli, Deivis. Essays in behavioral economics. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/88645