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University of British Columbia

Software solutions for mitigating physical attacks against robotic autonomous vehicles

Abstract

dc:description

Robotic Autonomous Vehicles (RAVs) rely on onboard sensors for perception and autonomous decision making. However, RAVs are vulnerable to physical attacks, such as GPS spoofing and gyroscope manipulation, that exploit physical channels to compromise sensors. These attacks pose serious safety risks and can lead to widespread damage and mission failures. Traditional software security methods, such as cryptography or memory isolation, are ineffective against physical attacks. This thesis presents five comprehensive software solutions to secure RAVs against physical attacks. These solutions do not require any hardware modifications, and can be seamlessly integrated into RAV's existing software stacks. (1) RAVAGE introduces a configurable software tool that emulates physical attacks in a realistic and reproducible manner. It provides a software setup for benchmarking the impact of physical attacks and validating defense techniques. Building on this foundation, this thesis presents attack detection, diagnosis, and recovery techniques, which enable RAVs to operate safely even under adversarial interference. (2) PID-Piper introduces a Feed-Forward controller (FFC) that runs in tandem with the RAV’s primary controller and monitors it to detect attacks. The FFC uses a system model instead of corrupted sensor inputs; thus, it remains robust to attacks. Upon attack detection, the FFC takes over control to recover the RAV back to its desired state and enables mission completion. (3) DeLorean performs diagnosis to isolate the compromised sensors, and uses historical data to derive safe recovery actions. Its diagnosis-guided recovery mechanism enables reliable operation even under multi-sensor attacks. (4) SpecGuard combines multi-objective policy learning with adversarial training to achieve resilience against sensor perturbations. SpecGuard not only ensures mission completion under attack but also enforces safety specifications, such as avoiding collisions or preventing entry into restricted zones, during recovery. (5) ARMOR introduces a two-staged reinforcement learning framework that enables learning attack-resilient control policies. It first leverages attack-aware privileged information to accelerate robust policy learning in simulation, and then uses transfer learning to adapt the policy for real-world deployment. By developing comprehensive and practical software solutions for physical attack detection, diagnosis, and recovery, this work enables the deployment of RAVs in a wide range of safety critical applications.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
University of British Columbia
Year dc:date
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Dash, Pritam
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Pattabiraman, Karthik

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/93035

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of British Columbia
Base URL
circle.library.ubc.ca/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Dash, Pritam. Software solutions for mitigating physical attacks against robotic autonomous vehicles. doctoral thesis, University of British Columbia, 2025. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/93035