University of British Columbia
Towards practical cache side-channel mitigations for language interpreters
Abstract
dc:descriptionModern applications increasingly rely on language interpreters that execute code in shared environments, where cache side channels can expose sensitive information. However, cache side-channel mitigations have not been explored for language interpreters, and adapting existing techniques is challenging due to the complex and dynamic nature of interpretation. We identify the interpreter mechanisms responsible for these leakages and develop practical mitigations tailored to interpreter execution. Our approach mitigates application control-flow leakage by using transactions to dynamically linearize executed bytecode instructions, data-access leakage through probabilistic obfuscation, and leakage from the bytecode's internal implementation through lightweight cache isolation. We integrate these mitigations into a limited proof-of-concept implementation in QuickJS and evaluate their effectiveness and performance overhead. Our preliminary results demonstrate that cache side-channel defenses can be integrated into interpreters while providing meaningful security guarantees.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Science - MSc
- Level thesis:degree_level
- master's
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Computer Science
- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of British Columbia
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Dankert, Kjell
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Mehta, Aastha
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/2429/95319