University of British Columbia
Impact of transitioning to a non-incentivized emergency physician pay model on emergency department performance, physician productivity, and physician satisfaction
Abstract
dc:descriptionEmergency physicians face competing incentives to move patients quickly, complete safe and thorough care, and sustain a viable workforce. I study a January 2024 payment reform in Victoria, British Columbia, that replaced a blended, partially volume-linked emergency physician pay model with fixed shift-rate pay. Using Nanaimo as a comparison site, I estimate site-month difference-in-differences models and physician-month decompositions. The reform slowed flow: median wait to physician increased by 46.5 minutes, non-admitted ED length of stay increased by 36.6 minutes, and a standardized throughput index combining patient wait times and length-of-stay outcomes worsened by 1.09 standard deviations. Patient volume per 8-hour-equivalent shift fell by 1.15 patients. At the same time, lab orders rose by 62.4 per 100 ED visits and hospital admission fell by 1.41 percentage points. I do not detect clear short-run safety deterioration. The reform reduced the rewarded margin, patient volume and speed, while shifting care toward more ED-based workup and potentially improving workforce sustainability.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts - MA
- Level thesis:degree_level
- master's
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of British Columbia
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wall, Brian
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Norris, Samuel
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/2429/95496