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University of Minnesota

Government Contract Transparency and Payoffs from Political Connections

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I examine how the disclosure of government contract information required by the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) since 2007 affects firm political campaign contributions. The public disclosure of details of government contracts after FFATA can be used by firms to identify politicians who can influence government contract allocations in favor of their campaign donors. Consistent with this expectation, I find that, in the post-FFATA period, firms significantly increase contributions to politicians who are more influential in government contract allocations. Correspondingly, I find that politicians engage in increased contract allocations in favor of campaign donors after FFATA. These results are more pronounced for politicians in competitive races, for non-competitive government contracts, and for firms that were less strategic campaign donors before FFATA. Overall, the results highlight an unintended consequence of government contract disclosures – that government contract transparency helps firms build more effective political connections and increases rewards for their political contributions.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Yao, Yixin Ethan

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Citation
Yao, Yixin Ethan. (2024). Government Contract Transparency and Payoffs from Political Connections. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/264377.

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Minnesota
Base URL
conservancy.umn.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Yao, Yixin Ethan. Government Contract Transparency and Payoffs from Political Connections. 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/11299/264377