Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis thesis addresses the design of secure microarchitectures with a focus on defending shared lastlevel caches against side-channel attacks. Four interrelated contributions are presented. First, First-Time Miss (FTM) eliminates cache hit-based leakage by ensuring that the first access from any core always appears as a miss, with negligible hardware and performance overhead. Second, DE+DRP introduces a two-level dynamic randomization scheme using an indirection table, defeating advanced conflict-based attacks while incurring less than 4% performance overhead. Third, the Non-Fusion Inter-Domain Coherence Protocol (NF-IDCP) solves the domain fusion problem in randomized caches enabling secure data sharing across security domains with less than 5% performance overhead and less than 3% hardware overhead. Fourth, CrossFind provides a formal methodology for detecting microarchitectural defense assumption violations when composing multiple defenses, discovering 13 problematic interactions across 29 defense combinations. Together, these contributions demonstrate that comprehensive cache side-channel defense is achievable with modest cost.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Ramkrishnan, Kartik
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Citation
- Ramkrishnan, Kartik. (2026). Modern Techniques for Securing Microarchitectures. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/281802.