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University of Minnesota

Modern Techniques for Securing Microarchitectures

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis addresses the design of secure microarchitectures with a focus on defending shared lastlevel caches against side-channel attacks. Four interrelated contributions are presented. First, First-Time Miss (FTM) eliminates cache hit-based leakage by ensuring that the first access from any core always appears as a miss, with negligible hardware and performance overhead. Second, DE+DRP introduces a two-level dynamic randomization scheme using an indirection table, defeating advanced conflict-based attacks while incurring less than 4% performance overhead. Third, the Non-Fusion Inter-Domain Coherence Protocol (NF-IDCP) solves the domain fusion problem in randomized caches enabling secure data sharing across security domains with less than 5% performance overhead and less than 3% hardware overhead. Fourth, CrossFind provides a formal methodology for detecting microarchitectural defense assumption violations when composing multiple defenses, discovering 13 problematic interactions across 29 defense combinations. Together, these contributions demonstrate that comprehensive cache side-channel defense is achievable with modest cost.

Author and committee

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Author dc:creator
  • Ramkrishnan, Kartik

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Citation
Ramkrishnan, Kartik. (2026). Modern Techniques for Securing Microarchitectures. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/281802.

Chain of custody

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University of Minnesota
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-19
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citation

Ramkrishnan, Kartik. Modern Techniques for Securing Microarchitectures. 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/11299/281802