Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation studies self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises, with a focus on how portfolio choices by the government—over debt maturity and international reserve holdings—determine vulnerability to confidence-driven fluctuations in bond spreads. The first paper, “Debt Sustainability, Confidence Risk and International Reserves,” co-authored with Carlos Bolivar, studies the role of international reserves in preventing self-fulfilling crises in a three-period model of slow-moving debt crises following Lorenzoni and Werning (2019). We show that a government exposed to the risk of multiple equilibria can eliminate the possibility of self-fulfilling crises by issuing debt to accumulate reserves. Debt-financed reserve accumulation effectively extends the maturity of the government’s portfolio: in states where investors coordinate on low bond prices, the government holds a larger stock of risk-free assets that can be used to buy back devalued long-term bonds, relaxing the budget constraint and undermining the pessimistic equilibrium. This mechanism makes reserve accumulation optimal even when the government’s net foreign asset position is low. We provide empirical evidence that governments tend to accumulate reserves during periods of elevated bond yields, consistent with the theory. The second paper, “Shorter Debt, Higher Risk: Maturity Choice in Self-Fulfilling Crises,” co-authored with Carlos Bolivar, proposes an alternative framework for measuring the role of confidence risk in the Italian debt crisis of 2010–2012. We build on Lorenzoni and Werning (2019) by adding an endogenous choice of debt maturity. In our model, a Calvo style confidence crisis—in which investors coordinate on low prices for long-term bonds rather than excluding the government from markets—implies that higher confidence risk calls for shorter maturity: by issuing more short-term bonds, the government reduces its exposure to the pessimistic equilibrium. This prediction is the opposite of the Cole–Kehoe benchmark and reconciles Italy’s observed maturity shortening with rising confidence risk. We calibrate the model to Italian data and use a particle filter to infer the time series of confidence shocks. Our estimates imply that self-fulfilling beliefs account for approximately 80 percent of the Italian sovereign spread at the peak of the crisis.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
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- Wongrattanapiboon, Teerat
Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Citation
- Wongrattanapiboon, Teerat. (2026). Essays on Sovereign Debt and Self-Fulfilling Crises. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/282415.