University of Minnesota
Vulnerable Minds, Vigilant Minds: The Intersection Between Epistemic Vigilance and Suggestibility to Misleading Information in Childhood
Abstract
dc:description.abstractChildren are frequently called upon to provide testimony in forensic, medical, and educational contexts where the accuracy of their accounts carries significant legal and personal consequences. Despite decades of research, children remain vulnerable to accepting misleading suggestions, and the mechanisms underlying this vulnerability are not fully understood. The present dissertation examined whether children's suggestibility depends not only on the strength of their memory representations but also on how they evaluate the reliability of information provided by others and the accuracy of their own narrative accounts of experienced events. Across two studies involving 327 children aged 3 to 6 years, epistemic vigilance and narrative ability were examined as potential protective factors against children's acceptance of misleading suggestions, with individual differences in theory of mind, executive functioning, and language ability included as cognitive covariates to account for variability in children's broader cognitive functioning. Study 1 (N = 225) employed an experimental design in which children were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: informant evaluation, statement evaluation, or a control condition receiving no epistemic vigilance support. Children in both epistemic vigilance conditions showed significantly lower acceptance of misleading suggestions than children in the control condition, while the two active conditions did not differ from each other. Individual differences analyses revealed that age and executive functioning were the strongest predictors of suggestibility, with theory of mind showing a trend-level association. Study 2 (N = 102) extended these findings by incorporating a narrative recall component alongside a replication of the epistemic vigilance manipulation. Children in both epistemic vigilance conditions again showed lower acceptance of misleading suggestions than control children. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that narrative accuracy, reflecting the veridicality of children's event recollections, predicted lower suggestibility above and beyond age and theory of mind, whereas narrative quality, reflecting the structural organization and elaboration of children's accounts, did not; however, this accuracy effect was attenuated in a follow-up analysis that adjusted for narrative length. Robustness analyses further demonstrated that higher-order theory of mind, indexed by performance on the most advanced items of the Wellman and Liu (2004) scale, was a particularly strong predictor of suggestibility and accounted for significant additional variance above and beyond narrative measures. An omnibus analysis confirmed that both epistemic vigilance condition and theory of mind independently predicted suggestibility when examined simultaneously. Together, the findings advance a more integrated account of children's suggestibility by positioning epistemic vigilance as a central protective mechanism that operates through multiple pathways. Epistemic vigilance, defined as the set of cognitive processes through which individuals evaluate the reliability of information and the trustworthiness of its sources, reduced children's acceptance of misleading suggestions both when activated experimentally through accuracy monitoring tasks and when reflected naturally in the veridicality of children's own narrative recollections. This convergence suggests that epistemic vigilance functions as a general evaluative orientation that can be engaged whether children are assessing the claims of others or monitoring the accuracy of their own accounts. Advanced theory of mind emerged as an additional independent contributor, pointing to the role of social-cognitive reasoning in supporting resistance to misleading information. These findings carry direct implications for forensic interviewing practice, supporting the value of incorporating brief epistemic vigilance primes into investigative protocols as a low-burden means of reducing children's vulnerability to misleading suggestions before substantive questioning begins.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
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- Bisla, Isaac S.
Subjects
dc:subject × 5Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Citation
- Bisla, Isaac S.. (2026). Vulnerable Minds, Vigilant Minds: The Intersection Between Epistemic Vigilance and Suggestibility to Misleading Information in Childhood. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/283117.