University of Nevada - Reno
Social Distance: Isolating Relevant Variables Using a Prisoners Dilemma Game
Abstract
dc:description.abstractSocial discounting describes the devaluation of an outcome as the recipient increases in social distance. The social discounting paradigm allows for a behavioral analysis of altruism and cooperation; however, the social distance variable has remained unexamined. Two studies were conducted to examine how social distance and cooperation change as a function of probability of reciprocation (Experiment 1) and delay to reciprocate (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, three probabilities were assessed (25% for a strategy favoring defection, 75% for a strategy favoring neither defection nor cooperation, and 100% for a strategy favoring cooperation). Results across forty-eight participants indicated that while 100% probability of reciprocation resulted in the highest cooperation and closest social distance, social distance did not change precisely with probability of reciprocation. In Experiment 2, probability of reciprocation was held constant (100%) and delay to reciprocate was manipulated (3 s, 8 s, and 13 s). Results across forty participants showed that order of delays affected cooperation. Across all groups, the 3 s CP was ranked closest in social distance. Overall results suggest that delay to reciprocate influences social distance rankings. Both studies contribute to the social discounting literature by providing an empirical investigation of social distance and its influences.
Degree
thesis:*- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctorate Degree
- Department thesis:degree_department
- Psychology
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Buddiga, Natalie Rose
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Locey, Matthew L
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Houmanfar, Ramona A
- Lewon, Matthew P
- Cowie, Sarah
- Pingle, Mark
Subjects
dc:subject × 5Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- http://hdl.handle.net/11714/8546