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University of North Texas

The Myth of Strategic Superiority: Us Nuclear Weapons and Limited Conflicts, 1945-1954

Abstract

dc:description

The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of North Texas
Year dc:date
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Morse, Eric
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Citino, Robert
  • Wawro, Geoffrey
  • Mitchener, Donald

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Public
  • Morse, Eric
  • Copyright
  • Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved.
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc115124/
ark: ark:/67531/metadc115124

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of North Texas
Base URL
digital.library.unt.edu/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Morse, Eric. The Myth of Strategic Superiority: Us Nuclear Weapons and Limited Conflicts, 1945-1954. University of North Texas, 2012. https://doi.org/10.12794/metadc115124