University of North Texas
Three Essays on the Effects of Executives' Informal Networks on Shareholder Value, Financial and Tax Reporting Outcomes
Abstract
dc:descriptionPrior literature suggests that CEOs capitalize on their position within the hierarchy of all business executives, resulting in various – both positive and negative – firm outcomes. Using a novel data set on golf outings to measure the quality of a CEO's informal (vs. formal) network, as measured by the CEO's network centrality, this study examines whether well-connected CEOs generate private gains through insider trades. Results suggest that, among golfing CEOs, CEOs with higher quality informal networks generate significantly higher insider trading profits on sales of their firms' stock, consistent with more famous, powerful, and influential CEOs possessing superior information. The paper continues by delineating a channel through which private information flow to network participants by documenting significantly different golf patterns of CEOs during the two weeks before material firm events become public while showing that CEOs generate noticeably higher insider trading profits from stock trades executed during the two weeks following these golf outings. This study highlights a setting in which shareholders are at risk of wealth transfer and illustrates the potential limitations of regulation concerning insider trading.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of North Texas
- Year dc:date
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Klaus, Jan Philipp
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Iyer, Govind S.
- Brown, Jennifer
- Pavur, Robert J.
- Sun, Lili
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Public
- Klaus, Jan Philipp
- Copyright
- Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved.
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
-
local-cont-no: submission_2086
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1707258/
ark: ark:/67531/metadc1707258