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University of North Texas

A Study of Mitigation Methods for Speculative Cache Side Channel Attacks

Abstract

dc:description

Side channels give attackers the opportunity to reveal private information without accessing it directly. In this study, several novel approaches are presented to mitigate cache side channel attacks including Spectre attack and its variants, resulting in several contributions. CHASM shows the information leakage in several new cache mapping schemes, where different cache address mappings may provide higher or lower protection against cache side channel attacks. GuardCache creates a noisy cache side-channel, making it more difficult for the attacker to determine if an access is a hit or miss (which is the basis for most side channel attacks). SecurityCloak is a framework that encompasses GuardCache with SafeLoadOnMiss whereby cache load misses during speculative execution are delayed until the speculation is resolved, thus preventing attacks that rely on accessing data in during (mis) speculated executions. To search for a compromise between security and performance, it is recommended not always to use protections such as SecurityCloak protections, but also to activate the protection only while executing critical sections of code or on-demand when an attack is detected (or suspected). Our experimental results show a high degree of obfuscation (and prevention of side channels) with a minimal impact on the performance.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of North Texas
Year dc:date
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Mosquera Ferrandiz, Fernando
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Kavi, Krishna M.
  • Tunc, Cihan
  • Mehta, Gayatri
  • Pottathuparambil, Robin
  • Gulur, Nagendra

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Public
  • Mosquera Ferrandiz, Fernando
  • Copyright
  • Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved.
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
local-cont-no: submission_3683
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2332527/
ark: ark:/67531/metadc2332527

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of North Texas
Base URL
digital.library.unt.edu/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Mosquera Ferrandiz, Fernando. A Study of Mitigation Methods for Speculative Cache Side Channel Attacks. University of North Texas, 2024. https://doi.org/10.12794/metadc2332527