University of North Texas
Iron Fists, Bound Wrists: The Impact of Legislative Power-Sharing on the Conflict Propensity of Autocracies
Abstract
dc:descriptionDo higher levels of legislative power-sharing among autocracies reduce the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes? This study argues that legislative power-sharing in autocracies functions as a constraint against an autocrat’s ability to unilaterally initiate disputes, thereby reducing the likelihood of their occurrence. By employing Hecht’s (2025) recently developed measure of power-sharing in authoritarian legislatures, I test this theoretical argument using data for all autocracies from 1946 to 2001, ultimately finding modest empirical support for this notion. This support remains robust across a series of alternate model specifications. The results of this study provide scholars with a better understanding of how authoritarian governmental institutions can constrain ruling autocrats, and opens the door for future research into authoritarian regimes, institutions, and conflict.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of North Texas
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Johnson, Ryan Anthony 1999-
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Hensel, Paul R.
- Ishiyama, John T.
- Greig, Michael
Subjects
dc:subject × 3Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Public
- Johnson, Ryan Anthony 1999-
- Copyright
- Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved.
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
-
local-cont-no: submission_5007
ark: ark:/67531/metadc2652511