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University of North Texas

Accounting Measurement Bias and Executive Compensation Systems

Abstract

dc:description

This dissertation presents empirical evidence intended to help answer two research questions. The first question asks whether executive compensation systems appear to exploit the bias in accounting-based performance measures in order to reduce the volatility in executive compensation and to allocate incentives more effectively across the range of activities performed by the executive. The second question asks whether compensation systems systematically differ between firms that use alternative accounting methods and whether any such systematic difference helps explain accounting choice. Parameters estimated in fixed-effects endogenous switching regression models were used to test the risk-shielding and incentive-allocation hypotheses. The models were estimated across a dataset consisting of 1151 executive-year observations of annual compensation paid to 222 top-level executives in 40 oil and gas firms. The dataset was partitioned by accounting method and separate models estimated for the full cost and successful efforts partitions. The tests provided modest support for the risk-shielding and incentive-allocation hypotheses, revealing that accounting measurement bias is used to focus incentives for effort in the exploration activity and to reduce executives' exposure to production risk. The design also allowed an estimate of the proportional change in compensation that was realized from the accounting choice actually made.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of North Texas
Year dc:date
1994

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Boone, Jeffery Paul
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Boynton, Charles E.
  • Redfearn, Michael R.
  • Coe, Teddy L. (Teddy Lewis)
  • Raman, Krishnamurthy K.
  • Brown, Robert William

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Public
  • Copyright
  • Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved.
  • Boone, Jeffery Paul
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
call-no: 379 N81d no.4018
untcat: b1831046
local-cont-no: 1002720746-boone
ark: ark:/67531/metadc278949

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of North Texas
Base URL
digital.library.unt.edu/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Boone, Jeffery Paul. Accounting Measurement Bias and Executive Compensation Systems. University of North Texas, 1994. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278949/