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University of North Texas

Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels.

Abstract

dc:description

The theory of auction has become an active research area spanning multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing and management science. But a close examination of it reveals that most of the existing studies deal with ascending (i.e., English) auctions in which it is assumed that the bid increments are continuous. There is a clear lack of research on optimal descending (i.e., Dutch) auction design with discrete bid levels. This dissertation aims to fill this void by considering single-unit, open-bid, first price Dutch auctions in which the bid levels are restricted to a finite set of values, the number of bidders may be certain or uncertain, and a secret reserve price may be present or absent. These types of auctions are most attractive for selling products that are perishable (e.g., flowers) or whose value decreases with time (e.g., air flight seats and concert tickets) (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005). I began by conducting a comprehensive survey of the current literature to identify the key dimensions of an auction model. I then zeroed in on the particular combination of parameters that characterize the Dutch auctions of interest. As a significant departure from the traditional methods employed by applied economists and game theorists, a novel approach is taken by formulating the auctioning problem as a constrained mathematical program and applying standard nonlinear optimization techniques to solve it. In each of the basic Dutch auction model and its two extensions, interesting properties possessed by the optimal bid levels and the auctioneer's maximum expected revenue are uncovered. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the major propositions where appropriate. The superiority of the optimal strategy recommended in this study over two commonly-used heuristic procedures for setting bid levels is also demonstrated both theoretically and empirically. Finally, economic as well as managerial implications of the findings reported in this dissertation research are discussed.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of North Texas
Year dc:date
2010

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Li, Zhen
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Kuo, Ching-Chung
  • Pavur, Robert J.
  • Miles, Grant

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Public
  • Copyright
  • Li, Zhen
  • Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved.
Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
oclc: 666859519
untcat: b3866637
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc28450/
ark: ark:/67531/metadc28450

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of North Texas
Base URL
digital.library.unt.edu/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Li, Zhen. Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels.. University of North Texas, 2010. https://doi.org/10.12794/metadc28450