University of North Texas
Trade Negotiations in Agriculture: A Comparative Study of the U.S. and the EC
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis study applies Destler's institutional counterweights to Putnam's two-level analysis, substituting Liberal Institutionalism and Realism for internationalism and isolationism, in a comparative case study of the roles played by the U.S. and the EC in multilateral trade negotiations in agriculture under the aegis of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade during the first half of the Uruguay Round. Using game theory as an analytical tool in the process, this present study demonstrates that a clear pattern emerges in which stages of cooperation and deadlock can be easily anticipated in games of Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma in accordance with various but predictable levels of institutional influence.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of North Texas
- Year dc:date
- 1994
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Gordon, H. William (Harold William)
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Reban, Milan Jan
- Kemerer, Frank R.
- Forde, Steven
Subjects
dc:subject × 9- food industry and trade
- European Economic Community
- United States
- agriculture and state
- government policy
- Food industry and trade -- Government policy -- United States.
- Food industry and trade -- Government policy -- European Economic Community countries.
- Agriculture and state -- United States.
- Agriculture and state -- European Economic Community countries.
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Public
- Gordon, H. William (Harold William)
- Copyright
- Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
-
local-cont-no: 1002572339-Gordon
call-no: 379 N81 no.7093
untcat: b1846886
oclc: 33240973
ark: ark:/67531/metadc935682