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University of South Florida

Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯Are Local Directors Better Monitors, and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management

Abstract

dc:description

Previous literature have documented that the independent directors play a crucial goal in corporate governance but the research on the firm value and board independence remains inconclusive. In my dissertation, I examine the impact of independent directors' geographic proximity to corporate headquarters on the effectiveness of corporate boards and the motivations of board directors. Using a large sample of directors trading, I show that independent directors who live close to headquarters ("local director") earn higher abnormal returns on their trades than other directors, and that this advantage is stronger in small firms. Further, I find an inverse relationship between the number of local independent directors on the board and firm value. Companies with fewer local independent directors also have higher ROA ratios, lower abnormal CEO compensations, and higher CEO incentive compensations. Collectively, the findings suggest that local independent directors are more informed but less effective monitors. I also provided evidence that firms with a higher proportion of directors' incentive compensation are more likely to manage earnings. Directors are more likely to exercise options in the year following the firms' earnings management being in the top tercile of the sample. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias. Taken together, the evidence suggests that director incentive pay is more likely to align directors' interest with the CEO's, rather than to induce the directors to act in the best interest of the shareholders.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Business Administration
Grantor
University of South Florida
Year dc:date
2008

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wan, Hong
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Chris Pantzalis, Ph.D.
  • Delroy Hunter, Ph.D.
  • Ninon Sutton, Ph.D.
  • Jianping Qi, Ph.D.

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

Language dc:language
EN-US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/550

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of South Florida
Base URL
digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Wan, Hong. Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯Are Local Directors Better Monitors, and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management. Dissertation thesis, University of South Florida, 2008. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/550