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University of South Florida

The Role of Trust in Judgment

Abstract

dc:description

In this dissertation I defend five claims about trust: 1) trusting and trustworthiness are conceptually but not causally connected; 2) trust is risky; 3) trust requires good will; 4) trust is a two-part relation; and 5) trust is an interpretative framework. A concern for trust often appears in discussions about testimony and the expectation of truthfulness; Bentley Glass, John Hardwig, and Jonathan Adler each address the role of trust in science while assuming a necessary connection between trusting and trustworthiness. I argue that this conception is untenable because a justification for one fails to suffice as a justification of the other. I show, instead, that it is our assessment that links trustworthiness to trusting. My second claim, that trust involves risk, is contentious. I argue that the common understanding of risk as harm, which is held by Russell Hardin, contains the more technical understanding of risk as uncertainty, which is suggested by Niklas Luhman. Trust is risky precisely because it is inherently uncertain. Annette Baier argues that failing to recognize a distinction between trusting and action associated with that trust leads us to accept accounts of trust that are too broad. I argue that trust is to believe that another is concerned with your well-being, has good will, because she is concerned about you and not that it will necessarily benefit her in some way. Seeing trust as good will allows me to advance my fourth claim, that trust is a two-part relation, because trust is the assessment of another's good will towards me. Trusting another is believing that the other's good judgment will include concern and consideration for my interests because they are my interests. My fifth point follows naturally once trust is understood to be a risky, two-part relation requiring good will: it is an interpretive framework. Our trust in another sets the tone for understanding her behavior such that we take her actions as either supporting or blocking our interests. This account takes the capacity to trust to be the foundation for, rather than merely an outgrowth of, our judgments.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
University of South Florida
Year dc:date
2009

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hudspeth, Christophe Sage
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Stephen Turner, Ph.D.
  • Brook Sadler, Ph.D.
  • Hugh LaFollette, Ph.D.
  • Sandra Schneider, Ph.D.
  • Michael Gibbons, Ph.D.

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

Language dc:language
EN-US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/2020

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of South Florida
Base URL
digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Hudspeth, Christophe Sage. The Role of Trust in Judgment. Dissertation thesis, University of South Florida, 2009. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/2020