University of South Florida
A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws
Abstract
dc:descriptionRecent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor
- University of South Florida
- Year dc:date
- 2015
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Winters, Andrew Michael
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Douglas Jesseph, Ph.D.
- Alexander Levine, Ph.D.
- Roger Ariew, Ph.D.
- Otávio Bueno, Ph.D.
- John Carroll, Ph.D.
- Eric Winsberg, Ph.D.
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5603