Abstract
dc:descriptionThere was a long-standing consensus that Ockham was a Divine Command Theorist - one who holds that all of morality is ultimately grounded in God's commands. But contrary to this long-standing consensus, three arguments have recently surfaced that Ockham is not a divine command theorist. The thesis of this dissertation is that, contrary to these three arguments, Ockham is a divine command theorist. The first half of the dissertation is an analysis of the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for virtuous action, whereas the second half is a response to the three contemporary arguments that Ockham isn't a divine command theorist. In a way, the first half of the dissertation gives a prima facie case that Ockham is a divine command theorist; the second half concludes so ultima facie.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor
- University of South Florida
- Year dc:date
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Dee, Matthew
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Thomas Williams, Ph.D.
- Roger Ariew, Ph.D.
- Colin Heydt, Ph.D.
- Mor Segev, Ph.D.
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7776